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ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to determine the economic factors that best explain the decisions of
the International Trade Commission in antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard cases,
utilizing the economic data collected by the Commission for each investigation. We also
consider the extent to which these factors measure the injury conditions and causation
relationships specified in U.S. trade laws.
Our analyses yield mixed results. For example, while the Commission tends to require
declining profits and employment in an industry before recommending import protection in
safeguard cases --asspecified in the law, it is not clear that it delineates between serious
injury caused by increased imports and serious injury due to other factors. Similarly, in
countervailing duty and antidumping cases, economic conditions, such as changes in industry
shipments and the degree of capacity utilization, are taken into consideration in material injury
decisions, but other factors one would expect to be associated with affirmative decisions, e.g.,
the ratio of unfair imports to consumption, do not seem to play a significant role. Some
variables also enter significantly in the regressions that do not seem to be indicators of material
injury.
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This paper investigates the decision—making process of the
International Trade Commission (ITC) in administering the
injury provisions of U.S. countervailing duty (CVD),
antidumping duty (AD), and safeguard laws. Specifically, we
attempt to determine the economic factors that best explain ITC
decisions under these laws. We also consider the extent to
which these factors measure the injury conditions and causation
relationships specified in the safeguard and unfair trade laws.
In CVD and AD cases, injury to a domestic industry is
caused by unfair increases in imports brought about either by
subsidization on the part of foreign governments or dumping by
foreign producers. If these unfair imports cause or threaten
to cause "material injury" (this being defined as injury "which
is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant"), a
special duty is levied against the imports equal to the margin
of subsidization or dumping. In determining whether a domestic
industry is materially injured, the ITC is directed by law to
consider (but not limit itself to) a common set of specific
economic factors.
In safeguard cases, where injury is not the result of
unfair competition, the ITC must find increased imports to be
"a substantial cause of serious injury, or threat thereof"2 to
'Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Public Law 96-39, July 26,
1979, Sec. 771, 93 Stat. 178,
2Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 100th
Congress, 2nd Session,Title I, Subtitle D, Part I, Sec. 1401.3
a domestic industry before recommending government assistance
aimed at facilitating its positive adjustment to import
competition. As in CVD/AD cases, in making its determination
on serious injury, the Commission is directed to consider
various specific economic factors, but not necessarily to
confine itself to these factors. They are meant to reflect the
greater degree of harm suffered by an industry when it is
"seriously injured" compared to being "materially injured."
Safeguard cases since 1974 are analyzed, since this is the
date of the last significant change in the safeguard law.
Since substantial changes in the CVD and AD laws were made in
the Trade Act of 1979, we focus on post-1979 unfair trade cases
but do report on an analysis of antidumping cases in the 1970s.
We identify separate ITC "determination functions" for each
type of case. These functions are so named because they relate
the economic data of the industry under investigation to the
ITC determination of whether material or serious injury has
occurred.
Several authors have empirically analyzed the decision—
making process of the ITC. Takacs (1981) investigates whether
macroeconomic variables influence the number safeguards
petitions as well as the injury decisions of the ITC over the
period 1949-1979. She finds that, while more cases are filed
in recession periods of high unemployment and low capacity—
utilization rates, the stage of the business cycle does not
influence the decisions of the ITC. Baldwin (1985) analyzes4
theeconomic factors influencing ITC safeguard decisions
between 1974 and 1983, utilizing the microeconomic data in the
Commission's reports on the investigations. He finds short—
term changes in industry profits and average percentage changes
in employment over the preceding five years to be the most
significant factors associated with affirmative findings.
Finger, Hall, and Nelson (1982) investigate the political
and economic factors influencing both CVD/AD and safeguard
decisions by the ITC over the period 1975—79, using data for
the 4—digit SIC industries into which the tariff lines covered
by the cases are classified. They consider safeguard cases to
be more political than CVD/AD cases, mainly because the
president need not accept the decisions of the ITC in safeguard
cases whereas the president plays no direct role in CVD/AD
determinations. As expected, they find political variables,
e.g., industry concentration and employment levels, to be more
important in the former type of cases. In contrast, technical
economic factors, e.g., capital/labor ratios, average wages,
and extent of scale economies are more significant in CVD/AD
cases than in safeguard petitions.
Herander and Schwartz (1984) investigate only AD cases
between 1976 and 1981, using data from the ITC reports. Their
logit regressions indicate that the likelihood of an
affirmative ITC decision is positively related to the dumping
margin and negatively related to the number of firms in the
industry, the change in employment in the industry, the ratio5
of profits to sales at the time of the decision, and the skill
level of the workers in the industry.
Hansen (1990) combines CVD, AD, and safeguard cases in
studying the political and economic factors influencing ITC
decisions between 1975 and 1984. The cases are grouped into 4-
digit SIC codes and economic characteristics of these
industries used as proxies for the particular cases. Using a
nested logit model, she finds various political factors
reflecting the importance of industries petitioning the ITC in
the districts of members of the Ways and Means Committee to be
significant determinants of ITC decisions as well as such
economic factors as percentage changes in industry employment
and market shares and the U.S. trade deficit.
Moore (1989), using the economic data from the ITC reports
from 1980—1988, estimates the effects of both political and
economic factors influencing the ITC's AD decisions. He too
finds that both kinds of variables matter. Moore also conducts
panel regressions across individual commissioners and finds
that there are significant commissioner-specific effects.
Anderson (1991) also analyzes AD decisions using data from
ITC reports as well as from other sources, but his
investigation covers the years 1986-1990. Unlike Moore, he
does not find that ITC decisions favor the economic interests
of members of the Trade Subcommittees of the House or Senate.
The only significant economic variables in his regressions are
an estimate of the percentage decrease in revenue earned by the6
domestic industry as a result of dumping and the level of the
industry's income to sales ratio.
Our study focuses on the economic factors influencing ITC
decisions in CVD, AD and safeguard cases, although some
attention is also given to political influences. The CVD and
AD cases cover the period 1980—1990, while the safeguard cases
run from 1975 through 1988. (There was only one safeguard case
in 1989-1990.) Besides estimating the best regressions for
each type of petition separately, we estimate commissioner—
specific effects in CVD and AD decisions.
The economic data come from the reports by the Commission
on its decisions. These provide data on the specific tariff
line items covered by the petitions. The problem with using 4-
digit SIC data is that many other items are usually included in
a particular 4-digit sector besides the products relevant for
the investigations, and, consequently, the economic
characteristics of a 4-digit sector may not be the same as
those for the relevant products.
Before discussing our analysis in detail and presenting
the empirical results, we provide a summary of the
investigations initiated under each mechanism over the sample
period in section II, including the identification of
industries which use the procedures as well as the countries
cited in CVD/AD cases. Section III then discusses the ITC's
statutory directives, while Section IV describes the data. The
model and empirical results are contained in Section V.7
Section VI draws some conclusions from the analysis.
II. use of the Fair Trade and Safeqaiard Laws, 975—l99O
The number of CVD/AD investigations undertaken by Commerce
and the ITC increased dramatically after the 1979 Trade Act. In
1980 alone, U.S. industries filed petitions leading to sixty-
eight CVD and 37 AD investigations (see Tables 1 and 2).
Between January 1, 1980 and the end of 1990, 306 CVD and 494 AD
investigations, representing a wide range of industries and
countries had been initiated. Table 1 classifies the 306 CVD
investigations initiated between 1980 and 1990 by product under
investigation, while Table 2 does the same for AD cases. An
average of 28 CVD and 45 AD investigations were initiated
annually during this period.
One striking feature of post-1979 CVD and AD
investigations is that nearly fifty percent involved iron or
steel products, or products made primarily with iron or steel.
Thirty-two percent of all CVD and ten percent of all AD
investigations over the period were filed by this industry in
one year, 1982. During that year alone, 104 CVD investigations
were initiated, requiring determinations for eight countries
and twenty—three iron or steel and related products. For
example, CVD petitions involving cold—rolled carbon steel sheet
and strip were filed against multiple countries——Belgium,
Brazil, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom and West Germany.8
Two interesting trends emerge concerning the nature of
CVD/AD investigations over the 1980—1990 period. First, there
has been a significant decline in the use of the CVD statute,
while use of the AD statute has remained fairly steady over the
period. The number of investigations involving the chemical,
food and iron/steel industries, which represent 77% of all CVD
cases and 43% of AD cases, have also generally fallen, while
other industries have used these statutes more aggressively
since 1984.
Tables 3 and 4 break down the 1980-1990 CVD and AD
investigations by country of exporter.3 In the CVD cases,
Brazil was cited most often--37 times in 11 years, followed by
France (28), Italy (24), spain (21), Canada (19), the United
Kingdom (18) and West Germany (18). The only other developing
country besides Brazil against whom a significant number of
cases were brought was south Korea with 17 cases. The AD
investigations have a different distribution, with Japan by far
the leader with 64 allegations of dumping. West Germany (33),
Taiwan (31), south Korea (28), Italy (27), Canada (25), and the
United Kingdom (22), have also been cited frequently.
Over the entire period, 70% of the CVD cases and 57% of
the AD investigations involved developed countries, with 55% of
the CVD cases and 31% of the AD case being directed against the
n investigation typically consists of a single product
from a single country. However, investigation TA—701—6
investigated viscose rayon staple fiber from both Austria and
Japan. Therefore, there are 307 country—investigations during
the period.9
European Community. During 1980-1982, when chemical, food and
iron/steel industries brought most of the cases, the European
Community accounted for nearly seventy percent of all
investigations.
As Table 5 shows, the iron and steel industry has also
been the most frequent user of the safeguard law. However, a
wider variety of industries have used this law compared to the
CVD/AD laws. The most important development with regard to
safeguards is the significant decline in the number of
petitions after 1979. There were no changes in the safeguard
law at that time, but the 1979 Trade Act made it considerably
easier to gain affirmative decisions in CVD/AD cases by
defining material injury in a manner that could be satisfied
more easily. The Congress also pressured President Carter into
transferring the administration of the CVD/AD laws from the
Treasury Department to the Commerce Department, which tends to
be more sympathetic than Treasury to the competitive problems
of U.S. producers, and members of the Senate Finance Committee
informed those nominated to administer these laws that they
expected antidumping and countervailing duty protection to be
granted more frequently than in the past. As a result of these
changes, firms seeking protection utilized the CVD/AD laws to a
greater extent rather than petitioning for relief under the
safeguard law.
III. In-jury Determinations: Statutory Criteria for ITC10
Consideration
As previously noted, the CVD, AD and safeguard laws direct
the ITC to take into account a number of specific economic
factors in reaching its injury determinations. However, these
statutes also state that the Commission need not limit itself
just to the factors that are mentioned.
In safeguard cases where the ITC must determine whether an
article is being imported in such increased quantities as to be
a substantial cause of serious injury for an affirmative
finding, the factors specified for ascertaining serious injury
are:
"(i) the significant idling of productive facilities in
the domestic industry,
(ii) the inability of a significant number of firms to
carry out domestic production operations at a reasonable level
of profits, and
(iii) significant unemployment or underemployment within
the domestic industry."4
In judging whether there is a threat of serious injury,
the specified factors are:
"(i) a decline in sales or market share, a high and
growing inventory (whether maintained by domestic producers,
importers, wholesalers, or retailers), and a downward trend in
production, profits, wages, or employment (or increasing
4omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 100th
Congress, 2nd Session, Title I, Subtitle D, Part I, Sec. 1401.ii
underemployment) in the domestic industry,
(ii)the extent to which firms in the domestic industry
are unable to generate adequate capital to finance the
modernization of their plants and equipment, or are unable to
maintain existing levels of expenditures for research and
development,
(iii) the extent to which the United States market is the
focal point for the diversion of exports of the article
concerned by reason of restraints on exports of such article
to, or on imports of such article into, third country
markets.
The term "substantial cause" is defined as a cause which
is important and not less than any other cause. Furthermore,
in determining whether imports are a substantial cause of
serious injury or threat thereof, the ITC is directed to take
into consideration whether imports have increased, either
absolutely or relative to domestic production, and whether
there has be a decline in the proportion of the domestic market
supplied by domestic producers.
In AD and CVD cases the ITC is charged with determining
whether domestic industries are being materially injured by
reason of dumped or subsidized imports. In 1979 a common set
of criteria for reaching these decisions was established for
CVD and AD cases. Three general factors are mentioned in the
statutes as guides in reaching a decision: a
Ibid., Sec. 1401.12
"(I) the volume of imports of the merchandise which is the
subject of the investigation,
(II) the effect of imports of that merchandise on prices
in the United States for like products, and
(III) the impact of imports of such merchandise on
domestic producers of like products, but only in the context of
production operations within the United States."6
In evaluating the volume of unfair imports, the ITC is
directed to consider whether the volume of such imports or the
increase in the volume, either absolutely or relative to
production or consumption, is significant. The price effect of
concern to the drafters of the law is whether the unfair
imports result in significant price undercutting or prevent
price increases that otherwise would have occurred.
In considering the third criterion, the ITC is instructed
to evaluate all relevant economic factors, including, but not
limited to, actual and potential declines in output, sales,
market share, profits, productivity, return on investments, and
capacity utilization; factors affecting domestic prices; and
actual and potential negative effects on cash flow,
inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise
capital and investment.
In determining whether there is a threat of material
injury, the law lists ten economic factors for consideration,
6Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 100th
Congress, 2nd Session, Title I, Part 2, Sec. 1401.13
including whether there has been any increase in production
capacity in the exporting countries accused of unfair trade
practices, any rapid increase in the import penetration ratio,
any substantial increase in inventories in the United States,
and any negative effects on the domestic industry's efforts to
develop improved versions of the product.
IV. Data sources and Variable Construction
In conducting its injury investigations, the ITC obtains
industry performance data as well as detailed data regarding
the product in question by sending questionnaires to firms,
both domestic and foreign, involved in the production of the
product. The Commission publishes a report after each
investigation in which it explains its injury decision and
includes much of the non—confidential economic data collected.
To assure that only data considered by the ITC are included in
the estimation of its determination functions, all variables
entering into the regressions are constructed from these
data.7
A typical report contains industry performance data for
the three years (five years for safeguard cases) immediately
preceding the initiation of the investigation and details,
among other things, real and nominal values of the U.S.
industry's shipments (SHIP), exports, production (PROD),
4
TWeare grateful to Michael Moore for providing the AD data
through 1985 and for part of 1986.14
employment (EMP), value of net sales, cost of goods sold, and
net profits. In a some cases, productivity, investment, price
and wage data are also available, although the infrequency with
which these numbers are reported prevents their inclusion in
our formal econometric work. In CVD and AD cases, total
imports, imports from the subsidizing or dumping country, and
domestic consumption are reported, while in safeguard cases
imports and domestic consumption are presented. Since the
reports suggest that the ITC prefers real variables over
nominal variables, quantity data are used in the regressions.
These variables were entered into the regressions in one
or more forms. Some variables appear as levels for the most
recent year. However, because the regressions are run across
industries, only variables which are independent of units, such
as employment (EMP), the import penetration ratio (MC) and the
profit/sales ratio (PIS), can be included in level form. For
the other variables, percentage changes over some interval are
used. The ITC also may consider simply whether a variable
increases or decreases over recent periods. To investigate
this possibility, dummy variables are created. Dummy variables
take a value of unity if the corresponding change variable is
negative and zero otherwise.
Since an affirmative ITC injury finding is set equal to
unity and a negative finding to zero in the probit regression
p
analysis,percentage changes in such U.S. industry variables as
the profits/sales ratio, production, shipments, employment, and15
capacity are expected to have negative coefficients, that is,
the greater the decrease (increase) in such industry variables
the greater the likelihood that the decisions will be
affirmative (negative). However, percentage changes in the
volume or share of imports (all imports in safeguard cases and
"unfair" imports in AD and CVD cases) are expected to be
positively related to affirmative decisions. Dummies for the
direction of change in these imports should be negative, that
is, decreases (increases) in such imports, which are set equal
to unity (zero) are likely to be associated with negative
(positive) findings, which are set equal to zero (unity).
V. An Econometric Model of ITC Behavior
As stated at the outset, the empirical questions being
pursued here are: Which economic variables best explain the
injury decisions of the ITC and do these variables measure the
injury and causation relationships specified in the statutes?
To answer these questions we first turn to the empirical
identification of the "determination functions," namely, the
industryperformance data that best explain the serious injury
decisions in safeguard cases and the material injury decisions
inCVD/AD cases. Separate functions are estimated for
safeguard cases and for both CVD and AD cases.
Since the ITC's role is to determine whether a domestic
industry has been sufficiently injured to qualify as "serious"
injuryin safeguards cases or as "material" injury in CVDand16
AD cases, the injury determination process may be viewed
econometrically as a probit model, where y1=l is defined as an
affirmative determination in investigation i (the industry has
been sufficiently injured to be eligible for adjustment
measures) and y=O as a negative determination (the industry
has not been sufficiently injured). Each observation in the
regression represents an ITC investigation and determination,
for which data are available in the ITC reports.8
Variables that significantly increase the likelihood function
at the 10% level are kept in the regressions below, while other
variables are dropped. Table 6 lists the significant variables
in the various regressions together their expected signs.
A. Safequard Cases
The function that best explains serious injury
determinations in safeguard cases is shown in Table 79 It is
quite similar to that identified in Baldwin (1985, p.108).
(The number of findings of the "threat" of serious injury is
insufficient to run separate regressions analyzing the
8For the purposes of this analysis, each determination is
defined by a country-product pair for which a separate
determination is made by the ITC.Therefore, when the ITC
returns separate determinations for similar, yet distinct,
products in a single investigation, each is treated as a single
observation in the regression. For example, investigation TA—
701-167, Certain Carbon Steel Pipe from Italy, provides separate
decisions and data for two subcategories——small and large pipes,
yieldingtworegressionobservationsfor thesingle
investigation.
9The safeguard regressions cover the period 1975—1988 and
include 61 cases in which there were 90 separate decisions on
different products.17
decision—making process for such cases.) DPIS4 is the 4-year
percentage change in the industry profit/sales ratio. Its
negative sign indicates that an affirmative decision is more
likely the greater the decline (or smaller the increase) in an
industry's profit/sales ratio. Baldwin (1985) showed a 1-year
change in profits/sales ratio to be significant. This variable
was also significant in our regressions when it replaced DPIS4,
but DPIS4 was kept since it was more highly significant. NTE
is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if both DPIS4 and
the change in industry employment are negative over the 5—year
period. Baldwin (1985) found a similar variable to be
significant. Both changes in profits and in employment are
mentioned in the statute as being relevant in determining the
threat of serious injury.
T80_88 is a dummy variable taking a value of unity for
cases initiated during or after 1980, the period during which
the 1979 Trade Act was in effect. Its negative coefficient
implies that affirmative serious injury decisions have been
more difficult to achieve since the 1979 Trade Act. As noted
earlier, the safeguard provisions were not modified under the
1979 Act, but changes in the CVD/AD provisions were made that
enabled firms to obtain protection on grounds of unfair foreign
competition more easily. Perhaps, as protection became easier
to obtain in the 1980s under the CVD/AD laws, the ITC raised
its threshold level for finding "serious injury" in order to
delineate this type of injury more clearly from the "material18
injury" criterion under the unfair trade laws.
THIRD, a duimny equal to unity when a particular product is
investigated for the third time under the safeguard statute,
has a significant positive coefficient, indicating that
persistence in petitioning for protection apparently pays of f.
Time dummies and repeated case dummies were not used in the
earlier study.
Finally, a macroeconomic variable, DRGNP, the most recent
annual percentage change in real GNP, is significantly
negative, that is, the greater the percentage decline in real
GNP, the greater the likelihood of an affirmative decision.
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 states that
the Commission "in making determinations" shall "consider the
condition of the domestic industry over the relevant business
cycle, but may not aggregate the causes of declining demand
associated with a recession or economic downturn in the United
States economy into a single cause of serious injury or threat
thereof."1° In other words, the ITC should consider the stage
of the business cycle in assessing serious injury but should
find in the affirmative if increased imports are a substantial
cause of serious injury, even though decreased industry demand
due to a general economic downturn is an even more important
cause of serious injury.
)(ost surprising is the absence of some measure of change
10Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Title I,
Subtitle D, Part I, Section 1401.19
in imports or in the import penetration ratio in the
determination function, given the statutory language that a
product must be "being imported in such increased
quantities"11 to be a substantial cause of serious injury.
This absence, together with the significance of short—run
changes in national income, suggests that the ITC tends to
decide in the affirmative whenever a U.S. industry that faces
import competition is being seriously injured, regardless of
the source of the injury.
B. CVD and AD Cases
The post-1980 CVD and AD determination functions are shown
in Table 8.12 In the samples used for the econometric
analysis, 66 percent of antidumping cases resulted in
affirmative decisions, that is, findings of material injury,
while 65 percent of the countervailing duty were decided in the
affirmative. Since the statutory criteria for determining
material injury are exactly the same for both forms of unfair
import competition, one expects the same variables to be
11Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 100th
Congress, 2nd Session, Title I, Subtitle D, Part I, Sec. 1401.
12TheCVD/ADregression cover the period 1980-1990. Not all
cases can be included in the regressions, since no report is
published for cases withdrawn, suspended or terminated before an
ITC determination occurs. Even when reports are published, those
cases involving industries with a small number of firms (three or
fewer) do not present the data collected in order to protect the
firms' private information. Because the data in the reports deal
with a very specific product, proxy data are unavailable at a
comparable level of disaggregation. Finally, some reports
contain information on only a few of the variables used in the
regressions.20
significant in both sets of cases. It turns out that the four
statistically significant variables (at the 10% or less level)
for the AD cases are also significant in the CVD cases.
However, other variables are significant in the CVD cases in
addition to these four.
The four common significant variables in both AD and CVD
regressions are: the ratio of total imports in the industry to
the consumption of the product (MC), (the higher this ratio,
the more likely an affirmative decision); the percentage change
in capacity over the most recent year (DCAP), (the greater the
decline in capacity, the greater the likelihood of an
affirmative decision); the direction of the two-year percentage
change in the quantity of dumped or subsidized imports from all
sources (LDCUMDUM), (affirmative decisions are more likely if
these imports have increased); and whether the product under
investigation (from any country) had been subject to a previous
investigation of the same type (REPPROD), (repeat products
stand a greater chance of receiving an affirmative decision).
In addition, in the CVD cases, affirmative decisions are
more likely the greater the percentage decline in shipments
over the last year (DSHIP); the higher the level of employment
(EMP); if the decision is a final one (FINAL), (the ITC appears
to be less stringent in its requirements at the final decision
stage than at the preliminary stage); and if the product and
country had not been previously investigated (REPCASE) (a case
previously decided in the negative decisions is likely be21
decided in the negative when resubmitted).13
The signs and significant levels of most of these
variables are consistent with the so—called titrendsil approach,
which, as Anderson (1992) points out, seems to be utilized by
most commissioners in reaching their decisions in AD and CVD
cases. Following the procedure outlined in the safeguard
statute (but not explicitly stated in the AD/CVD statutes),
commissioners following this approach first determine whether
the industry is materially injured and, if it is, then decide
if the injury is by reason of the unfair imports. They look at
trends in such economic variables as shipments, capacity
utilization, and employment in determining material injury and
consider such factors as changes in the volume of unfair
imports and changes in the ratio of unfair imports to
consumption in deciding whether the injury is by reason of the
unfair imports (Kaplan,l99l).
Clearly, a decline in capacity utilization is an
indication of material injury, as is a decline in shipments.
Furthermore, the finding that an affirmative decision is more
likely if the direction of percentage change in the volume of
unfair imports is positive suggests that the commissioners do
consider the causal relationship between unfair imports and
material injury. However, one would also expect percentage
13Sincethe sumof REPROD andREPCASE in CVD casesis only 4
slightlynegative,the decrease in the probability of obtaining
an affirmative determination on the second filing is, however,
small.22
increases in the ratio of unfair imports to consumption to be
significantly related to affirmative decisions. Once a
determination of injury for an industry is made, continuing to
find injury for the industry no matter from which country
further dumped or subsidized imports come, seems a reasonable
position for the commissioners to adopt.
The finding that the ratio of all imports (rather than
just unfair imports) to consumption is significantly associated
with affirmative decisions does not seem consistent with the
logic behind the trends analysis. High levels of unfair
imports to consumption together with increases in this ratio
suggest a causal relationship between unfair imports and
material injury, but there seems to be no good economic reason
why the degree of openness in an industry, by itself, should be
related to material injury. The association between the level
of employment and affirmative decisions in CVD cases also does
not seem consistent with the statutes and might indicate that
political clout plays a role in CVD decisions. There is no
indication from the statutes just what relationship to expect
between ITC decisions and the FINAL and REPCASE variables.
We next assume that commissioners focus on the same
economic variables in reaching their decisions but differ in
their threshold levels for finding material injury. We follow
Moore (1989) by creating a panel of data ——votesby
commissioner on cases over the sample period ——inorder to
investigate this phenomenon. In the panel regressions, each23
commissioner is allowed to have his/her own intercept term.
Lower intercept estimates imply higher material injury
thresholds for the commissioner to vote affirmatively.
Table 9 indicates the wide variations in voting behavior
among commissioners. At one end of the spectrum are
Commissioners Lieberler, Cass, Brunsdale and Alberger who voted
affirmatively 50% or less of the time in both AD and CVD cases.
In contrast, Haggart, Moore, Bedell and Frank voted
affirmatively in 80% or more of the AD and CVD cases in which
they participated. Stern, Rohr, Lodwick, Calhoun, Newquist,
and Eckes fall within the range of greater than 50% but less
than 80%.
Table 10 shows the panel regressions for AD and CVD cases.
Interestingly, not only do many commissioners' threshold levels
of material injury differ significantly, but some new economic
variables enter significantly in the panel models. As
expected, Lieberler, Brunsdale, and Cass have the highest
injury thresholds (lowest intercepts) in both AD and CVD cases.
However, the large negative coefficient for Newquist is
surprising. But the fact that Haggart, Moore, Bedell, and
Frank (who never cast a negative vote) have the largest
positive signs is expected.
The second part of Table 10 shows the economic variables
that matter in the panel regressions. In the AD regression the
percentage change in shipments (DSHIP) and a dummy variable
indicating whether the case is against Japan (JAPDUM) are now24
significant. This latter variable and one indicating whether
the case involved a less developed country were not significant
when included in the non-panel regressions. The other
significant variables in this regression are the same as in the
non—panel AD regression, namely, the import penetration ratio
(MC), the percentage change in capacity over the most recent
year (DCAP), the direction of the two—year percentage change in
cumulative dumped or subsidized imports (LDCtJMDUM), and whether
the product has been subject to a previous investigation
(REPROD).
All the variables significant in the non-panel CVD
regression except the change in capacity over the most recent
year (DCAP) and whether the decision is a final one (FINAL) are
also significant in the panel regression, namely, the import
penetration ratio (MC), the direction of the two—year change in
cumulative dumped or subsidized imports (LDCtJMDUM), the level
of employment (EMP), whether the product has been subject to a
previous investigation (REPROD), and whether the product and
country has been investigated previously (REPCASE).
Four additional variables are significant in the panel CVD
cases, namely, the share of subsidized imports to total imports
of the product (CTYNM), the two-year percentage change in this
ratio (LDCTYMM), the one-year percentage change in subsidized
imports (DCUM), and the two-year percentage change in
employment (LDE14P). These variables are all strong indicators
of injury or of a causal relationship between unfair imports25
and injury. Such findings suggest that the commissioners put
greater emphasis on economic factors in CVD cases than AD
cases. The dummy variables for Japan and less developed
countries are not significant for the panel or non—panel CVD
regressions.
Some commissioners have explicitly rejected the trends
approach. For example, Commissioner Cass, while granting trend
analysis makes "a certain rough sense", argues that it "lacks
any systematic means either for correlating imports with
performance or for determining the probable impact of other
variables" (Cass, 1989, pp. 3—4). Cass and Commissioner
Brunsdale appear to use the so—called "comparative effects"
approach under which the effect of dumping or subsidization on
the revenues earned by the domestic import—competing industry
is calculated from the dumping or subsidy margins, the share of
the market captured by the unfair imports, and estimates of the
elasticities of demand for imports and the home product, the
elasticity of substitution between the domestically produced
good and imports, and the elasticity of supply of the home
product (Anderson, 1992). Anong the economic factors included
in our regressions, one would expect to see the ratio of unfair
imports to consumption and the change in unfair imports to be
significant variables in the determination functions of
commissioners adopting this approach.
"The common set of variables best explaining AD and CVD
decisions in the panel and non—panel regressions are DSHIP, MC,
LDCUMDUM, and REPPROD.26
Other commissioners have followed the so—called "margins"
approach. Under this framework, the extent by which the price
charged by the exporting country at home is less than the price
it charges in the U.S. market (the margin of dumping) is
compared to the extent to which the price of the imported
product in the United States is less than the price charged by
like goods produced in the United States (Cass, 1989; Kaplan,
1991). If the margin of underselling is greater than the
margin of dumping, advocates of this approach reason that
imports did not cause material injury because the price of
imports would have been lower than the U.S. product even if
there has been no dumping. In contrast, they find injury when
the underselling margin is less than the dumping margin.
Given that commissioners are likely to differ not simply
in their threshold levels for finding material injury but in
terms of the variables they consider in reaching their
decisions, regressions were runonindividual commissioners to
determine the variables that best explain the AD and CVD
decisions of each. The significant variables for individual
commissioners in AD and CVD cases are reported in Table 11.
The one variable that enters significantly for almost all
commissioners in both AD and CVD cases is the ratio of total
imports to consumption. While the commissioners differ
considerably in terms of other specific variables, most seem to
f requiresome indication of material injury, such as a decline
in profits, shipments, capacity utilization or employment, for27
an affirmative decision in AD and CVD cases. Furthermore, in
AD cases, a majority of the commissioners appear to require
some indication that unfair imports are increasing before
making an affirmative determination, while a high import
penetration ratio of unfair imports is significantly related to
affirmative decisions for a few members.15
An attempt was made to determine if economic factors also
played an important role in AD cases prior to 1979 under the
1921 antidumping law.16 (The results are not shown in table
form.) Unfortunately, no economic data were included in ITC
reports until 1976 50thesample size is only 41.17 The only
economic factor of significance in the expected manner between
1976 and 1979 is the short—run change in the capacity
utilization rate for an industry. This suggests that perhaps
economic factors have played a greater role in the decision—
decision—making process of commissioners since the revision of
the AD law in 1979.
15Allof the variables are significant at the 10 percent
level, but a few have the wrong sign.In the regression for
Lieberler, whose unique interpretation of the statutes did not
survive judicial review (Kaplan, 1991), the signs on the change
in profits and in capacity utilization are negative rather than
positive for her antidumping decisions. In addition, the signs
on the direction of change of dumped imports in Lodwick's AD
regression and on the change in capacity in Eckes' CVD
regressions are unexpected.
16A similar effort could not be undertaken for countervailing
duty cases, since there was no material injury requirement (and
thus a role for the ITC) prior to the 1979 Trade Act.
17The ITC took over the responsibility for making injury
determinations in AD cases from the Treasury Department in 1954.28
V. Conclusions
We conclude that the evidence is mixed on the extent to
which the ITC is guided in its decision-making by economic
factors that measure the injury conditions and causation
relationships specified in the relevant statutes. The
Commission clearly uses economic guidelines set forth in the
law in reaching its serious injury determinations in safeguards
cases. Specifically, decisions tend to be affirmative if there
is a downward trend in industry profits and employment in the
sector.
It is less clear, however, whether the ITC delineates
between serious injury caused by increased imports and serious
injury caused by other factors. The absence of any variable
indicating that the Commission considers the extent to which
imports have increased in reaching its decisions and yet the
significance of short—term changes in real GNP suggests that it
does not make this distinction.
The analyses of CVD and AD cases also yields mixed
results. That commissioners take into account the trend in the
economic variables mentioned in the AD and CVD laws is evident
from the finding that affirmative material injury decisions are
more likely the greater the percentage decline in an industry's
shipments, in its degree of capacity utilization, and, in the
case of CVD petitions, in its employment level. Furthermore,
the fact that the ITC takes into consideration the percentage29
change in dumped or subsidized imports (rather than changes in
all imports) in CVD decisions, and the direction of the
percentage change in AD cases, indicates a recognition of the
causation relationship specified in the unfair trade laws.
However, some variables that one would expect to enter
significantly into the various regressions are missing. For
example, since most commissioners apparently use the trends
approach, one expects increases in the ratio of imports to
consumption in safeguard cases and increases in the ratio of
unfair imports to consumption in CVD and AD cases to be
associated with affirmative decisions. The failure to find
percentage declines in profit rates to be related to
affirmative decisions in unfair trade cases is also surprising,
as is the finding in only one regression of a significant
relationship between affirmative decisions and percentage
changes in employment.
Furthermore, there are indications that variables
unrelated to material injury caused by unfair imports influence
ITC decisions. The ratio of total imports (fair or unfair) to
consumption and, in the case of CVD petitions, the level of
employment are such variables. The significance of the import
penetration ratio suggests that Commissioners are more
sympathetic to an industry's petition the less competitive the
industry is internationally, while the importance of the
employment variable in CVD cases suggests that size in itself
may be a factor in the determination process. It is also30
apparent from the panel regressions that Commissioners differ
considerably not only in their threshold level of material
injury but in the economic variables they consider most
relevant in reaching their decisions.
The finding that the ITC follows the economic guidelines
set forth in the law somewhat more closely in CVD than AD cases
may be part of the explanation for the significant decline in
the number of CVD cases since the early 1980s. Similarly, the
apparent stiffening of the ITC standards in safeguard cases
after 1980 may help account for the decline in the number of
these cases in the 1980s.Table 1
U.S. Countervailing Duty Investigations, 1980—1990:
Initiation of Investigations by Product under Investigation
All
19801981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Years
Source: USITC Annual Reports, 1980—1991















1811 2 0 1 1 3 0 0 1 1 38
31 3 1 0 4 5 0 0 0 1 1 46
4 3 104 6 17 12 1 0 2 0 2 151
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
3 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 6
0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 1 6
0 0 0 0 3 4 1 0 0 0 0 8
3 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 6
0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4
3 0 5 2 0 411 2 6 2 0 35
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Table 5
U.S. Safeguard Investigations, 1975—1990:
Initiation of Investigations by Product under Investigation
Product
Category 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
1. Chemicals 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.Food 2 5 1 0 1 1 0
3. Iron/Steel 3 2 7 2 0 0 0
4.Leather 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
5.Machinery 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6. Non—ferrous Metals0 0 1 1 0 0 0
7. Footwear 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
8. Textiles/Apparel 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
9.Luither 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Products 1 1 3 4 2 0 1
All Products 9 9 13 7 4 2 1
Product All
Category 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Years
1. Chemicals 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
2.Food 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 12
3.Iron/Steel 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 19
4.Leather 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
5. Machinery 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
6. Non—ferrous Metals 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
7.Footwear 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
8. Textiles/Apparel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
9. Lumber 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
Other Products 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 16
AllProducts 3 1 6 3 2 0 1 0 1 62
Source: USITC nnua1 Reports, 1976—199140





DPIS Most recent change in income/sales ratio
LDPIS 2—year change in income/sales ratio
DPIS4 4—year change in income/sales ratio
DSRIP Most recent change in shipments
LDSHIP 2—year change in shipments
DPROD Most recent change in production
DCAP Most recent change in capacity utilization
LDCAP 2—yearchange in capacity utilization -
DCUM Most recent change in quantity of "unfair"
isports from all countries +
LDCUM 2—year change in quantity of unfair imports
from all countries +
DEMP Most recentchange in esploysent -
LDEMP 2—yearchange in eaploysent -
LDCTYMM 2—year change in quantity of unfair imports
from country under investigation +
DRGNP Moat recent change in real GNP
Levels
Employment 7
Mq Ratio of total imports to consumption 7
CTYW4 Quantity of unfair imports from country




T80_88 Safeguard case in 1980 or before (1)
or after 1980 (0)
ThIRD Product investigated for third time under
safeguard statutes (+1); otherwise (0) +
NTE Both profit rate and employment decreased
over 5-year period (+1); otherwise (0) +
FINAL Decision is final (+1); decision is
preliminary (0)
7
REPPROD Product subject to previous investigation
(+1); otherwise (0) +
RIPCASE Product and country subject to previous
investigation (+1); otherwise (0)
JAPDTJM Case against Japan (+1); otherwise (0)
DCUMDTJM Negative percentage change in unfair
imports from countries in most recent
period (+1); otherwise (0)
LDCUMDI.JM Negative percentage change in unfair
imports from all countries over 2—year
period (+1); otherwise (0)



















Nuibersin parentheses are t—statjstjcs
42Table 8: Probit Regression Results for CVD and AD Investigations1
REGRESSIONS COMBINING
BEST INDIVIDUAL ALL VARIABLES FROM
REGRESSIONS INDIVIDUALREGRESSIONS
Post- Post- Post-
VARIABLES 1980 AD 1980 CV 1080 AD 1980 CV2
CONSTANT 0.057 —0.087 0.033 —0.087
0.382) (0.355) (0.191) (0.355)
DSNIP — —0.026 0.000 —0.026
(4.085) (0.151) (4.085)
MC 0.016 0.018 0.017 0.018
3.840) (2.247) (3.769) (2.247)
LDCUNDUN —0.406 —0.683 —0.436 —0.683
(2.435) (2.269) (2.370) (2.269)
DCA.P —0.025 —0.040 —0.023 —0.040
(3.737) (2.308) (3.332) (2.308)
EM? — 1.264E—5 1.555 E—6 1.264 E—5
(1.734) (0.627) (1.734)
FINAL — 1.015 —0.025 1.015
(2.473) (0.161) (2.473)
REPROD 0.446 2.138 0.495 2.138
(2.603) (3.434) (2.545) (3.434)
REPCASE — —2.256 —0.227 —2.256
(2.644) (0.609) (2.644)
361 172 361 172
#/%correct
predictions 260/72% 123/72% 262/73% 123/72%
.2*loglike. 414.048 172.161 413.012 172.161
X—Sq. Stat. 46.433 51.53 47.470 51.53
Numbersinparentheses are t—statistics.
2Resultsfor regressions combining all variables from
individual regressions for CVD investigations are the same as the
best individual regression for CVD investigations.
43Table 9:Percentage of Affirmative Votes by Commissioners and Rankings
of Commissioner Voting Tendencies for AD and CVDCases
AD CV
Commissioner Affirmative Eç % Affirmative
Lieberler 15 1 49 4
Cass 21 2 38 1
Brunsdale 28 3 48 3
Alberger 50 4 44 2
Stern 58 5 59 6
Rohr 62 6 74 9
Lodwick 64 7 76 10
Calhoun 70 8 57 5
Newquist 74 9 62 7
Eckes 78 10 71 8
Haggart 80 11 89 11
Moore 83 12 na na
Bedell 83 12 100 12
Frank 100 13 100 12
44Table 10: Panel Regression Results for CVD and AD Investigation&
VARIABLES Post— Post—





























Numbersin parentheses are t—statistics.
45Table 10 —(continued)



























predictions = 123/71% 667/79%
_2*Log Likelihood = 1908.237 729.057
x—sq. Stat. 118.267 203.574
46Table 11 Individual Cosunissioner Ragressions
COMMISSIONER AD CASES CVDCASES
Alberger MC, CTYNC DPROD,MC, DEIS
Brunsdale EM?, DCUM, CTYMC, JA?DUM
Calhoun D?IS, MC, CTYMC DSNIP, MC, DPIS
Eckes DSHIP, MC, LDCUMDUM MC,LDCUM, LDCAP
Lieberler LDPIS, MC, LOCk?, JA?DUM MC, OEM?
Lodwick MC, DCUMDUM,DCAP,REI'PROD MC, FINAL, LDSHI?
Newguist LDCUMDUM
Rohr MC, DCAP, FINAL, REPPROD LDSNII', MC, LOCk?,
REPCASE
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